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One problem which characterised the Uganda fish market
in the 19705 was that it experienced an increase in the market
demand for fish but corresponding expansion in output Was not
forthcoming and prices continued to rise. Studies were- for-
mulated to examine the different aspects of the industry to
identify the causes of the problem and how to eliminate them.
The following were investigated.
1- Objective function of the producers/dealers
What I~el of fish output a fisherman produces depends,
among other things, on the objectives he seeks to achjeve in going
about his fishing. To illustrate the point, a profit maximizing
entrepreneur dQeS not necessarily produce the same quantity of
fish output as a target producer with given inputs. The former
produces at a level where his marginal cost equals his marginal
revenue while the latter produces where his target is met.
The concern here was, therefore, to determine the goals that
the entrepreneurs in fish production and distribution sought to
attain, given by their objective functions, and to see if these
objectives had limiting effects on the quantities of fish or fish
marketing services offerred on the market. This was done by
making observations on their activities and deducing the
objectives from these observations. For the production entrep-
reneur, the following observations were made.
a) Output expansion: There was evidence that the fisher-
men reacted favourably to things which increased
output. These included the desire for more nets,.
migration to more productive fishing grounds etc.
b) Risk aversion: The fishermen took precautions
against 'risks of losing nets by reducing their fishing




c) Commercial production: Not many fishermen pro-
duced solely for subsistence but most produced to
derive incomes. They looked for revenue in cash
and not in kind.
d) Leisure preference: The fishermen did not fish all
'the hours but took some time off, foregoing income for
leisure.
e) Unsold fish: The fisherman did not sell all his fish.
Apart from his own consumption requirments, SOrle
fish was reserved for the consumption of close rela-
tives and neighbours as part of the fisherman's social
obligations.
The above observatiot'ts showed that the fisherman was a
profit maximizer but subject to the following other objectives
being fulfilled (constraints).
a) Some leisure is taken.
b) Risks are avoided.
c) Social obligations are met.
This study was inconclusive. It could not be argued that
output would be increased by eliminating th& constraints to the
profit - maximization objective above. Elimination of the
leisure -- ove'r - income preference might on the one hand lead
to more output in the industry but on the other, it might reduce
the efficiency, of the fisherman and lower the output. This is
hecause effici,ency does not increase indefinitely with the rate
of work but diminishing returns set in when the fisherman gets
exhausted.
Similary, elimination of the producer's risk aversion might
increase output by allOWing more fishing to be done but it would
also expose him to more production risks which would result in
loss of equipment and a fall in outjJut.
2. Product:on function of the producers
The objectives of the producer are realised through the
process of production. Output is the direct result: of the pro-
duction process. It was, therefore, intended to examine the pro-
duction process to determine whether it was the limiting factor
in the output of fish and a cause of the rising fish price:; on the
market. Observations were made on the factors/state variables in
fish production with a view to examining how they limited pro-












Homogeneity: Fishing capital was non-homogeneous, consis-
ting of boats and gear of varying sizes. This led to the problem of
lack of substitutability.
Availability: Scarcity of nets reported but despite the prob-
lems associated with the production of boats, there was excess
boat capacity in the industry.
Costs
•
Observations were made on the costs of the various capital
items. They "'Jere not only found to be high but net sellers were
observed to be earning economic rent.
Opportunity costs: Nil for gear but for boats it consisted of
output in the lake transport sector. This was, however, limited
by the low transfonnability of a fishing boat into a transport boat.
Marginal productivity: Zero for boats due to the excess
capacity, but positive and high for gear due to the gear scarcity.
Capital, therefore, constituted a constraint to output due to
the scarcity of gear and lack of substitutability of other forms of
capital for gear.
Labour
Homogeneity: Fishing labour was basically homogeneous
since there were many skill-cla~~s in fishing. Availability: There
was surplus labour in fishing dr~wn from school drop-outs and
agriculture as well as the lake region youths. There was "Haris-
Todaro moven-lent" of labour from alternative employment and
opportunity iflto fishin~ because of higher expected employment
and incomes in fishing, despite the almost zero marginal producti-
vity everywhere.
Costs: A wage fund of 400A! of catch, a remuneration method
that encouraged workers to produce more.
Opportunity cost: The opportunity cost of fishing labour was
the output in subsistence agriculture.
Since this was generally less than the returns to labwr in fishing,
there was no tendency for labour to move out of fishing, causing


















The functioning and performance of a market are determined
by the type of competition on the market. Entrepreneurs' deci-
sions on what levels of output to produce on the market "e
detennined by whether the market they operate on is characte-
rised by perfect competition, some form of oligopoly or whether
they hold monopolistic powers to manouvre the market supply
to earn monopol ist profits.
It was in vIew ot thIs that observations were made on the
structure of the fish market to determined the nature of the
competition prevailing on the market and how it affected output
and pricing decisions. Briefly, the following observations were
made:
Market structure of producers:
Atomistic, with many producers each supplying insiglificant
share of the market.
Barriers to entry:
New capacity setting up hindered by high investment costs,
unavailability of nets and lack of credit facilities.
Collusion: Fishermen's consultations on pricing decisions obser-
ved.
Contracts: Fishermen/Fishmonger agreements were often
observed, a factor limiting free c,ompetition.
Vertical integration: Two-stage, three-stage and even four-
stage vertical integration of the different functions on the fish
market, Instituted with a view to achieve anti-competitive
effects or simply to enhance market power were observed on the
fish market.
Despite the atomistic market structure, therefore, free
cqrnpetition did not prevail due to the high barriers to entry,
collusion of producers, contracts between producer!'; and
dealers and vertical integration of processes on the fish market.
This resulted in concentration of market power and possibly
kept output lower and prices higher than would have prevailed
under free competition.
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